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1.	The Amendments to the Maritime Labour Convention: An Answer to Unsolved Problems

The adoption, at the 103rd annual meeting of the International Labour Organization (ILO), of the amendments to the ILO Maritime Labour Convention (MLC) regarding financial security for abandoned seafarers, as well as for death and long-term disability due to occupational injury, marks a fundamental step in the protection of seafarers’ rights.
The Convention, adopted in 2006, and entered into force in 2013,​[1]​ codifies and consolidates several ILO conventions regarding seafarers’ work, as well as fundamental principles found in other ILO conventions, with the aim of promoting decent working conditions for this category of workers.
The amendments tackle two aspects that were left unsolved by the drafters of the Convention: at its 94th Session, the International Labour Conference (ILC), while asking the ILO Governing Body to allocate resources to promote ratification of the recently adopted MLC, noted that the Convention did not address the problems related to seafarers’ abandonment and compensation for death and long-term disability, and recommended that the ILO and the International Maritime Organization (IMO)​[2]​ continue their joint effort in this direction.​[3]​
As is known, maritime work is one of the first globalized sectors of international economy, implying that seafarers operate in a ‘fluid’ environment involving different jurisdictions. This, matched with the peculiarity of the ship as a workplace, requires that seafarers receive special protection for the risks inherent in their activities.​[4]​
The abandonment of seafarers and the failure of shipowners to provide compensation for personal injury or death are among the most serious risks suffered by seafarers. In light of this, the adoption of the amendments is inspired by a twofold logic: the promotion of decent working conditions on one hand and competitiveness concerns on the other.
Both abandonment and the handling of claims for personal injury or death involve a human and social dimension. Seafarers, as individuals, are entitled to fundamental human rights and, as a specific type of workers, benefit from an additional exclusive package of rights implemented by international organizations such as the ILO.​[5]​ Maritime work was one of the first employment sectors to be regulated – the first conventions in this field date back to 1920.​[6]​
In addition, in the context of maritime work, the need for minimum international standards capable of guaranteeing a ‘level playing field’ for economic operators is particularly pressing and has been one of the underlying motivations for the adoption of the MLC.​[7]​ In particular, the setting of standards for maritime work is seen as an answer to the unfair competition of ‘substandard ships’, the elimination of which is one of the IMO’s aims.
In the light of both the human rights issues and the economic issues, it is easy to understand why problems related to abandonment and death and long-term disability were tackled within the framework of the long-standing cooperation between the IMO and the ILO. In 2001, the IMO adopted two resolutions containing Guidelines related to these topics and that formed the basis for subsequent discussions and for the amendments themselves.​[8]​ The cooperation was institutionalized through the creation, in 1998, of the Joint Ad Hoc Expert Working Group on Liability and Compensation regarding Claims for Death, Personal Injury and Abandonment of Seafarers (hereinafter Joint Working Group), composed of representatives of both the IMO and the ILO. At its ninth session, the Joint Working Group reached an agreement on principles that was recommended for inclusion in a mandatory instrument.​[9]​
Since the adoption of the MLC, the issue has been taken up by the Special Tripartite Committee established by Article XIII of the MLC.​[10]​ In its first meeting, the Committee – that, according to Article XIII, has ‘special competence in the area of maritime labour standards’ – approved the text of the amendments to be adopted by governments’, employers’ and workers’ delegates, which it expected to enter into force in 2017.
The amendments were introduced through the accelerated procedure set out under Article XIV of the MLC, based on members’ tacit acceptance.​[11]​ However, the choice of amending the Convention was all but uncontroversial. A preliminary question was whether it would be preferable to adopt an instrument developed under the auspices of the ILO or of the IMO. The former has as its mission the protection of workers’ rights, which find specific representation through its tripartite structure, the latter has shown over time the capacity to consider maritime issues in a global way, by incorporating the human element into safety issues.​[12]​ Besides the competence ratione materiae, however, if compared to the IMO, the ILO offers additional guarantees thanks to its more effective supervisory system, based on the regular examination of reports by States on the application of ILO conventions, as well as on special procedures based on the submission of representations or complaints.​[13]​ The IMO, on the other hand, has no enforcement and compliance monitoring powers, which are instead entrusted to governments, including flag, port and coastal States.​[14]​
In addition to the question as to the choice of under the auspices of which organization a new convention would be developed, a further issue concerned the possible form of the instrument: a new convention, a protocol or an amendment to an existing convention, also taking into account the potential interaction with conflicting provisions of existing instruments or with instruments likely to be adopted in the near future.​[15]​
Several arguments supported the choice of an amendment of the MLC, the first of which was the fact that a new ILO convention would have been inconsistent with the process of consolidation, which was one of the main objectives of the MLC.​[16]​ Moreover, by amending the MLC, it would have been possible to build upon existing provisions and definitions, such as the duty of repatriation that already exists under the Convention. This argument is all the stronger if we consider that, in the context of abandonment, the Secretariat suggested that even in the case of a stand-alone instrument, a link with the MLC would have to be retained, for example by incorporating relevant parts of this latter.​[17]​
A further advantage inherent in the amendment of the MLC is the accelerated procedure offered by Article XIV of the Convention, which would have enabled to take into account concerns expressed in the Joint Working Group for a rapid solution.​[18]​ The limited time required to amend the MLC also made this solution preferable than the adoption of a protocol, which would mean a longer time before entry into force in a significant number of countries.​[19]​ Moreover, the adoption of a protocol would have proved less effective also in terms of participation in the new instrument: whereas a protocol only becomes binding upon Members that accept it, an amendment to the MLC is binding not only on Members that have already ratified this latter and later ratify the amendment, but also on all Members that subsequently ratify the MLC.​[20]​
The choice of the MLC as the most appropriate instrument to address the topics at issue did not, however, imply that the role played by the IMO in the process and its potential contribution to the drafting of the amendments should be ignored. The Final Report of the Joint Working Group underlined how the IMO Legal Committee would remain seized of the issue and keep it under consideration in the event that the amendments proved not to be feasible or timely.​[21]​


2.	Amendments to the Code implementing Regulation 2.5: Financial Security in Case of Abandonment

Before analysing the amendments and the provisions they relate to, it is necessary to briefly describe the structure of the MLC, which is one of its most peculiar aspects. According to its Explanatory Note, the Convention comprises three ‘different but related parts’: Articles, Regulations and the Code. Articles and Regulations contain mandatory principles and obligations. Articles are limited in number and contain provisions concerning definitions and the scope of the Convention, as well as its functioning, together with customary principles and rights. Regulations are divided into five Titles, relating to: minimum requirements for seafarers; employment conditions; accommodation, recreational facilities, food and catering; health protection, medical care, welfare and social security protection; compliance and enforcement.
The Code sets out more the detailed provisions necessary for the implementation of Regulations and has two parts: a mandatory part – ‘Standard’ (Part A) – and a non-mandatory part – ‘Guideline’ (Part B). The Convention is based on the principle of ‘vertical integration’, whereby each regulation has to be read in conjunction with the related Standard and Guideline.
The amendments do not directly concern Regulations, but rather the Code implementing them, and therefore the Standards and Guidelines, as well as the Appendixes. Amendments to Regulation 2.5 concern Standard A2.5 and Guideline B2.5, whereas Amendments to Regulation 4.2 relate to Standard A4.2 and Guideline B4.2.
The main purpose of Regulation 2.5 – falling under Title 2 of the Convention, devoted to conditions of employment – is to ‘ensure that seafarers are able to return home’. This right constitutes an essential element of seafarers’ working conditions and must be enjoyed either at periodic intervals during an ongoing contract or on completion of a contract.​[22]​ As it has been noted, the issue of repatriation is not related to immigration or to border controls, but, more simply, to the circumstances and conditions under which it has to occur and to the identification of the person who has to pay for it.​[23]​ In this regard, it is interesting to note that the IMO resolution adopted in 2001 recommended Member governments draw the attention of immigration authorities to the benefit provided to abandoned seafarers covered by a financial security system and to consider that the absence of a financial security system should not prejudice the immigration status of seafarers.​[24]​
The right to be repatriated and the idea that the shipowner should pay for it are not controversial, as the ILO Repatriation of Seamen Convention (n.23) dates back to 1926. However, the low number of States that ratified this Convention indicates a lack of consensus regarding the details of repatriation modalities.​[25]​
Regulation 2.5 establishes, on one hand, that seafarers have the right to be repatriated at no cost under the circumstances illustrated in the Code and, on the other, that Member States shall require ships flying their flag to provide financial security in order to guarantee this right. According to the Code, seafarers must be repatriated if the employment agreement expires while the seafarer is abroad, if the contract is terminated by either party, and if the seafarer is no longer able to carry out their duties under the contract.




1.1	Seafarers’ Abandonment: Definition and Scope

In general terms, customary international law does not impose on States on whose territory the abandonment occurs any specific obligation regarding the treatment of seafarers, apart from those imposed by norms relating to the treatment of aliens. On the basis of these norms, the flag State can seeks redress for damage on behalf of the members of the crew of a ship abandoned in a foreign territory. As established by the Saiga (n.2) decision of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, such an action can be exercised for all members of the crew, irrespective of their nationality.​[27]​ This statement was based, inter alia, on ‘the transient and multinational composition of ships’ crews and the multiplicity of interests that may be involved in the cargo on board a single ship’. The Tribunal observed that, if each person was to look for protection from its State of nationality, undue hardship would ensue.​[28]​ The reference to the multinational composition of the ship thus suggests that, in addition to recognizing the general duty of the flag State to exercise appropriate jurisdiction and control over natural and juridical persons, the Tribunal devoted special attention to the social dimension of the problem – that is, the effective protection of the rights of seafarers.
Notwithstanding this, it is reasonable to assume that, if the flag State does not intervene, protection can be claimed by the seafarers’ State of nationality. This would be consistent, by way of analogy, with the Barcelona Traction jurisprudence, according to which diplomatic protection of a corporation can be exercised by the State of which shareholders are citizens (and not by the State where the legal entity was incorporated) only if the corporation has ceased to exist.​[29]​
Both kinds of protection, however, are limited for two reasons. First, States are, in principle, entitled to, but not obliged to, exercise diplomatic protection;​[30]​ second, it is within each State’s sovereignty to decide the criteria according to which its nationality is granted.​[31]​ Given the widespread use of ‘convenience crews’ formed by individuals of different nationalities, seafarers could easily find themselves deprived of any protection, similar to what happens to stateless persons or to shareholders who, in the absence of any citizenship link, are completely unable to benefit from diplomatic protection.​[32]​
If, on one hand, Article 98 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) establishes the obligation for the flag State to render assistance to persons in danger and to rescue persons in distress on the high seas,​[33]​ no similar obligation exists for the State on whose territory the abandonment occurs, that is, the port State.
When they exist, obligations of this kind are contained in soft law instruments: the 2001 IMO resolution on abandonment urges governments, where seafarers have been abandoned within their jurisdiction, to inform the flag State of the ship and the States of which the seafarers are nationals, and to cooperate and assist each other in resolving the situation.​[34]​ Even if in more general terms, it is also interesting to note that the General Assembly Declaration on the human rights of individuals who are not nationals of the country where they live grants a limited set of fundamental rights to all aliens in the territory where they reside, regardless of the legal or illegal nature of their stay, and among those rights are the right to life (Article 5).​[35]​
The abandoned seafarer does not fall under the internationally recognized definition of refugee. Even assuming that, in addition to the so-called statutory refugees (i.e. those who fall under the definition in Article 1 of the 1951 Convention),​[36]​ groups of persons who are presumed to be without the protection of the government of their State of origin could be granted refugee status, it would still be essential that these persons crossed an international frontier for reasons traceable to conflicts, human rights violations or breach of international humanitarian law.
​[37]​
Few exceptions to this rule are found in British Empire agreements concerning distressed, deserting and refugee seamen. According to these treaties, if the seaman of a contracting party, after serving on board a ship of another party, remained behind in a third State, and they were in helpless conditions after a shipwreck or from other causes, the government of the flag State was bound to support them until they entered into ship-service again, found an employment or returned home.​[38]​ Similarly, the 1957 Agreement relating to Refugee Seamen grants seafarers who are refugees under the 1951 Convention the right to stay in the territory of the State under whose flag they, while a refugee, served for a certain number of days or of the State where they had their last lawful residence in the three years preceding the application of the Convention.​[39]​ The Agreement also requests Parties, ‘for the purpose of improving the position of the greatest possible number of refugee seamen’, to give sympathetic consideration to extending the benefits of the Agreement to refugee seafarers who, according to its provisions, do not qualify for those benefits.
The situation of abandoned seafarers rarely falls within the scope of international conventions regarding migrant workers – the effectiveness of which is in any case undermined by low ratification rates and by a strong disparity between States of origin and receiving States.​[40]​ Seafarers are often specifically excluded from the scope of these instruments,​[41]​ which are more aimed at regulating the migrant worker’s position in the ‘State of employment’ – which, for the seafarer, would be the State of nationality of the ship – and not the situation on the ship or in the territory of the State under the jurisdiction of which abandonment may occur.​[42]​
If, on one hand, documents mentioned above show a certain sensibility toward the situation of abandoned seafarers, on the other, they can’t be deemed to constitute an adequate basis for the existence of a customary or effective treaty-based obligation. State practice confirms this conclusion, if one considers the huge number of abandoned ships documented by the ILO Database on reported incidents of abandonment of seafarers.​[43]​

The relevance of abandonment-related issues can be easily explained by considering the public interest function that has been historically attributed to seafarers in relation to national economic and security objectives. From the most ancient times, shipowners were prevented from abandoning seafarers and repatriation was seen, at least in some legal orders, as an obligation due from the shipowner not only to seafarers, but also to the State.​[44]​
When the MLC was drafted, abandonment was not included among the circumstances where repatriation is due. This gave rise to the concern that, as a practical matter, the needs of abandoned seafarers might not be adequately addressed.​[45]​ Such concerns, together with the severe hardship faced by the maritime industry since the 1990s – which lead to frequent abandonment of seafarers due to shipowners’ failure to pay their wages – prompted ILO to tackle this issue through the revision of the MLC. The amendment to Regulation 2.5 therefore introduces abandonment as a specific circumstance where repatriation is due by the flag State, while obliging the flag State to make sure that shipowners have a financial guarantee that covers related costs.
The text adds a new Standard A2.5.2, setting out the obligation to make sure that an expeditious and effective financial security system exists, in order to assist seafarers in the event of their abandonment, without, however, providing any definition of ‘abandonment’. Given the financial consequences abandonment has on shipowners and the corollary of seafarers’ legitimate concerns for their repatriation, several points were raised about the definition of abandonment.
Situations involving terrorist attacks, war or piracy were the first controversial issue. Some Member States were in favour of a broader definition of abandonment, including where the shipowner has failed to pay wages to seafarers held captive by pirates or terrorist organizations.​[46]​ Other governments opposed the idea that terrorist acts alone could constitute abandonment, arguing that abandonment can only be due to an act of the shipowner and not to conduct of other actors such as pirates.​[47]​ The role of external actors (such as pirates of terrorists) in seafarers’ abandonment is, in turn, related to the seafarers’ potential responsibility in being abandoned. Shipowners’ representatives argued that the definition of abandonment should exclude ‘wilful misconduct’ on the part of seafarers, who, in turn, were concerned about how this concept would be interpreted.​[48]​
These concerns are not clearly addressed in the text of the amendments which, according to the Secretariat, seek ‘to clarify the concept rather than to define it’.​[49]​ As the main purpose of the new provision is to provide the administrators of the financial security with clear directions as to which cases constitute abandonment, it seemed preferable for the Joint Working Group to identify the cases in which seafarers are clearly in need of support rather than agreeing on a single definition.​[50]​
Paragraph 2 of Standard A.2.5.2 sets out three circumstances, the first of which applies where the shipowner fails to cover the cost of repatriation (lett.a).
In the second, abandonment is deemed to have occurred when the shipowner ‘has left the seafarer without the necessary maintenance and support’ (lett.b). The concern raised by shipowners’ representatives that this could cover even a minor breach of duty​[51]​ is partially addressed by paragraph 5, that States, for the purposes of paragraph 2 (lett.b), necessary maintenance and support include adequate food, accommodation, drinking water supplies, essential fuel for survival on board the ship and necessary medical care.
The third is where the shipowner has unilaterally severed their ties, including a failure to pay wages, with the seafarer for a period of at least two months (lett.c). The determination of a fixed period of time after which abandonment would occur has been criticized. According to some representatives, it would impede promotion of equal treatment in the employment of seafarers,​[52]​ whereas others observed that shipowners’ failure to pay two months of salary does not constitute abandonment.​[53]​
In relation to the definition of ‘seafarer’, it has been underlined that, in case of abandonment, spouses and supernumeraries (i.e. persons attached to a voyage but having no shipboard responsibilities, such as processors on fishing vessels) should also be repatriated.​[54]​ The amended Standard is silent on the point because, as the Standard is part of the MLC, the MLC definition applies.​[55]​

2.2 The Content of the Obligation to Provide Financial Security in Cases of Abandonment

According to the MLC, flag States have to substitute themselves for the shipowner who does not comply with their duty to repatriate seafarers and have the right to recover the related costs from them. The flag State’s responsibility for repatriation does not cease to exist if repatriation is carried out by the State from which the seafarers are repatriated or the State of which they are a national, as these States can recover the costs from the flag State. In light of the growing number of abandoned ships, the existence of financial security acquired a prominent place as an element which, in concrete terms, guarantees implementation of shipowners’ obligations – relieving the flag State from its duty to intervene – or, in the alternative, enables the flag State to recover the costs it or the other concerned States had to expend.
Paragraph 4 of Standard A2.5.2 States that the financial security system shall provide ‘direct access, sufficient coverage and expedited financial assistance’ to any abandoned seafarer on a ship flying the flag of the Member.
First, in relation to the means through which repatriation can be guaranteed, the Convention does not indicate any precise mechanism, leaving up the choice of the modalities they deem appropriate up to the Member States. Though frequently used, insurance schemes are not the only possibility way to  fulfil the obligation to establish financial security; in some countries, this objective will be achieved through already established social security schemes. However, some doubts were raised in relation to the coverage of such schemes, notably whether or not they would apply to seafarers who are not nationals of the flag State.​[56]​

The obligation to establish a financial security system, therefore, is aimed at providing assistance to abandoned seafarers. The content of such assistance is defined by letters a), b) and c) of paragraph 9 of the Standard, concerning the post-abandonment situation.
First, financial assistance must cover outstanding wages and other entitlements due from the shipowner to the seafarer, limited to four months of such wages and entitlements (par.9 lett.a). The amount of wages and other entitlements shipowners are obliged to pay has been one of the main points of discussion among representatives of shipowners and seafarers. The potential – provided for in an earlier version of the draft – of imposing payment of wages and other entitlements with no or only minor limitation was viewed by shipowners as a ‘huge problem for the maritime industry’.​[57]​ Within the Joint Working Group, seafarers’ representatives made clear that, if no agreement was reached on the wage issue, they would not agree that the instrument be adopted in the ILO.​[58]​ In particular, the number of months of wages and entitlements that was finally agreed struck a compromise between seafarers’ representatives – who saw three months as a minimum​[59]​ – and shipowners – who strongly asserted the need to limit wage recovery to the moment of repatriation, and underlined the existence of specific international instruments about maritime insolvency.​[60]​ The draft adopted by the Joint Working Group in 2008 established that the financial security system should provide for not less than three or four months of accrued wages, and specified, however, that no such limitation would apply to contractual entitlements.​[61]​ However, as early as 2009, the lack of limitation on contractual entitlements was dropped.​[62]​ In the last discussions before the adoption of the amendment, some governments proposed a new paragraph, which would make it possible for Members to set ceilings on the recovery of wages and to adopt measures to prevent possible abuses.​[63]​ Both shipowners and seafarers questioned the necessity of such a clause and the amendment was withdrawn.​[64]​ A further point raised with respect to par.9 lett.a), concerned its consistency with par.2 lett.c) of the Standard, which established that abandonment occurs when ties between the shipowner and the seafarer have been severed for at least two months. The Chair of the Joint Working Group clarified that the difference in the number of months is justified by the different purposes of the two provisions; the first one defines when abandonment occurs, whereas the second one defines the scope of financial security.​[65]​
Second, financial assistance must cover the expenses incurred by the seafarer, including the cost of repatriation (par.9 lett.b).  Paragraph 10 provides that cost of repatriation shall include travel, provision for food and accommodation, medical care, passage and transport of personal effects, and other reasonable costs.
Finally, the essential needs of the seafarer from the time of abandonment until their arrival at home must be provided for (par.9 lett.c).  There was some controversy as to where abandoned seafarers need to reach before provision for their needs could cease. The text of the Guidelines to Regulation 2.5 States that seafarers must be repatriated to countries with which they may be deemed to have a ‘substantial connection’, including – but not limited to​[66]​ – their country of residence. Seafarers and shipowners agreed that repatriation to a seafarer’s ‘home’ (not necessarily the same as the country of nationality) would be the most appropriate destination in the specific case of abandonment where the shipowner no longer exists.​[67]​ Because of the possibility of other options leading to complications, amendment proposals to modify this formula were not adopted.​[68]​ Apart from the final outcome of this discussion, it is interesting to note how the concept of ‘repatriation’ is, on one hand, somehow linked to the idea of citizenship (as it requires the determination of a place with which the seafarer has a ‘substantial connection’), but on the other, is inspired by the more concrete – and prevailing need – for the seafarer to return to their place of origin. This ambiguity can be easily explained by the original rationale of repatriation, that is, returning the seafarer to their workplace, as well as safeguarding national interests. In this respect, it is interesting to note that, in the Convention on Refugee Seamen, the obligation to grant refugee status is incumbent on the State on whose ships the seafarer has served for a certain period of time, as if service on a ship prevailed on the ‘genuine link’ requested by international law for the granting of citizenship rights.
As far as the meaning of ‘direct access’ to financial guarantee is concerned, paragraph 8 sets out that assistance shall be granted promptly upon request made by the seafarer or their nominated representative, and supported by the necessary justification of entitlement. The word ‘representative’ was added by the Tripartite Committee during the last discussions before the adoption of the amendments, on the basis of the concern, raised by the shipowners’ representative, that people without entitlement might request assistance,​[69]​ as well as the idea that the provision mandating the existence of a financial security system requires a narrow interpretation.​[70]​
Strictly related to the issue of seafarers’ representation are the modalities through which providers of financial insurance may acquire, by subrogation, the rights that the seafarer would have enjoyed. Paragraph 12 – the text of which was drafted under the heavy influence of the Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Group – makes subrogation possible, if the provider of financial security has made any payment to seafarers under the Standard, up to the amount it has paid and ‘in accordance with applicable law’. Issues raised in relation to subrogation concern, for example, the fact that in certain national jurisdictions the rights of the subrogated companies have been diminished, compared to the rights originally enjoyed by seafarers, for example by the lose of priority rights.​[71]​
The issue of the impact of applicable law on the rights of the subrogated entity might be particularly problematic for those States where the financial security will be ensured by social security providers. In response to the Statement by the Secretary-General, which Stated that the provisions governing the rule of law for such providers would be decided by national courts under applicable law, Norway’s representative asserted that, if that was the case, his delegation could not accept the insertion of the word ‘applicable’.​[72]​ This more generally raises the question of the determination of the law governing the relationships between the different actors involved in navigation, including, in the case at issue, not only the shipowner and the seafarer, but also the financial security provider. Although it is not possible here to consider the detail of this complex private international law issue, the growing relevance of factors – such as the seafarer’s nationality, the place where the contract has been signed or the country in which or from which the employee habitually carries out his work – in the determination of the applicable law and, conversely, the declining role of the nationality of the ship should be borne in mind.​[73]​ The multiplicity of factors determining the law applicable to working relationships can raise concerns for those States, like Norway, where the potential subrogated entity is a national social security scheme, which could be subject to a foreign law for the purposes of the obligations established by Standard A2.5.2.
A further relevant aspect of the coverage of the financial security is contained in paragraph 14, which states that the provisions of the Standard are not intended to be exclusive or to prejudice other rights, claims or remedies that may also be available to abandoned seafarers. The same Article states, however, that national laws and regulations may provide that amounts paid under the Standard can be offset against amounts received from other sources arising from any right that may be the subject of compensation under the same Standard.
The first sentence of the provision – featuring, in earlier versions of the text, as a chapeau to the whole Standard​[74]​ – immediately raised concerns as to its content and meaning, and, in particular, the possibility that a seafarer be covered twice.​[75]​ As explained by the Government Group, the provision is not meant for an additional or dual recovery and its rationale is to supplement seafarers’ existing rights.​[76]​ This is confirmed in the second sentence, added in subsequent stages of negotiations, which allows the offset of money received under the Standard.


2.3 Certification of Financial Security in Case of Abandonment and Notification Obligations

The obligation to subscribe to a financial security would be deprived of its effet utile if there was no control over the related certification. This leads to a more general theme, that is, responsibility for implementation of the MLC.
In this respect, the Preamble of the Convention mirrors Article 94 of UNCLOS, setting out the duties of the flag State.​[77]​ The provision establishes that ‘[e]very State shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’,​[78]​ including labour conditions,​[79]​ affirming the idea – endorsed by the MLC – that responsibility is left to the ‘default jurisdiction’​[80]​ of the flag State.
As is known, the role of the Flag State is directly related to the issue of the nationality of ships, defined by doctrine as ‘the allocation to the State of a bundle of international rights and duties in relation to that vessel’.​[81]​ In this regard, Article 91 of the UNCLOS sets out the sovereign right of States to set the conditions for the grant of their nationality to ships, for the registration of ships in their territory, and for the right to fly their flag. If the right of a State to attribute its nationality – therefore allowing a ship to fly its flag – is absolute, the exercise of diplomatic protection is subject to the condition of the existence of a genuine link between the State and the ship.​[82]​
UNCLOS does not define a ‘genuine link’. Notwithstanding the codification efforts of the UN,​[83]​ uncertainties still surround the meaning of ‘genuine link’, the consequences of its existence,​[84]​ and the problems linked to the proliferation of ‘flags of convenience’ States, which are often ‘unwilling or unable’ to exercise effective jurisdiction and control.​[85]​ These uncertainties prompted the international community to widen the category of States charged with the task of guaranteeing social rights, recognizing the right to exercise of jurisdiction to port or coastal States.​[86]​
With respect to the MLC, port State control (PSC) has a pivotal role, to the extent that, according to Regulation 5.2.1, foreign ships calling in the port of a Member may be subject to inspections to review compliance with the requirements of the Convention.​[87]​ When exercising that control, port States shall accept the Maritime Labour Certificate​[88]​ and the Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance (DMLC)​[89]​ as prima facie evidence of compliance, but the Convention sets out some exceptions where a more detailed inspection can be carried out.​[90]​ As the existence of financial security for repatriation of abandoned seafarers and for compensation for death or long-term disability have been added as a new item in both documents, compliance with the obligations established by the amendments automatically falls under the scope of PSC.
Paragraph 6 of the amendments sets out the obligation for States to carry on board a certificate – or other documentary evidence of financial security – issued by the financial security provider. The certificate shall be posted​[91]​ in a conspicuous place on board and be available to seafarers; its content is defined by Appendix A2-I to the MLC.
Concerns for the multiplication of administrative burdens for the flag State prompted some Members to propose that the certificate be included in the Maritime Labour Certificate mandated by the MLC.​[92]​ However, States finally agreed on a separate certificate, and Appendix A.5.II was modified to include the certification of financial security for repatriation in the Declaration of Maritime Labour Compliance.
As far as the responsibility for issuing the certificate is concerned, it is to be noted that the certificate relating to abandonment will be issued by a different entity – the financial provider –than the one issuing the Maritime Labour Certificate. In accordance with Standard A5.1.3.1, the Maritime Labour Certificate shall be issued to a ship by the competent authority, or by a recognized organization duly authorized for this purpose.​[93]​ This requirement could create coordination problems because of the different duration of the two documents: unlike the Maritime Labour Certificate, which is valid for five years,​[94]​ the certificate concerning abandonment does not have a fixed duration.
The Standard does not contain any specific requirement as to the language of the certificate. The proposal to impose the use of the English language, based on the MLC requirements related to PSC,​[95]​ was rejected during the last discussions of the Tripartite Committee, as it was considered sufficient that the documentary evidence be accompanied by an English translation.​[96]​
In relation to inspection, the certificate is open to control by both port and flag State: both Appendix I (relating to inspections by flag States) and Appendix II (relating to areas subject to inspection by an authorized officer in the port of a Member State) have, therefore, been modified by adding the item ‘Financial security for repatriation’.
Finally, according to paragraph 11, the financial security shall not cease before the end of its period of validity, unless the provider has given prior notification to the flag State authorities. Notification to the flag State is intended to enable it to take action against the shipowner, who would then be required to provide the necessary financial security for the ship to be allowed to operate.​[97]​


2.	Amendments to the Code Implementing Regulation 4.2: Financial Security for Seafarers’ Contractual Claims in Relation to Death or Long-Term Disability

Similarly to what was observed in relation to abandonment, general international law does not impose any obligation upon the flag State in relation to the death or long-term disability of a seafarer, apart from those obligations applying to the treatment of aliens. Therefore, as noted above, the flag State or, subordinately, the State of which seafarers are nationals can intervene in order to exercise diplomatic protection for the ship and the crew respectively. In addition, and similarly to the position in relation to abandonment, seafarers are often excluded from the coverage of conventions relating to migrant workers.
The MLC pursues the aim of protecting seafarers’ social rights through the obligation for flag States to ensure that seafarers are covered by adequate measures for the protection of their health, that they have access to medical care both on board and on shore​[98]​ and that they are provided with occupational health protection.​[99]​ However, if a damage occurs, the shipowner is financially liable and must provide adequate coverage: this is the obligation, set out in Regulation 4.2, for the flag State to establish measures to provide seafarers with a right to material assistance and support from the shipowner in relation to events that may occur while seafarers are serving under their employment agreement or arise from their employment under such agreement. The Regulation therefore provides for short-term social protection coverage and includes both the cost of care and the payment of wages during periods of sickness. If, on one hand, liability defined by the Regulation appears to be primarily temporal rather than causation-based, on the other, the use of the expression ‘arising from’ their employment creates some uncertainty as to the extent that it links death and long-term disability to activities related to employment, as opposed to general coverage during a certain period of time.​[100]​
In order to effectively guarantee shipowners’ liability, flag States are obliged to adopt laws and regulations requiring shipowners to provide financial security to ensure compensation in the event of the death or long-term disability of seafarers due to an occupational injury, illness or hazard (Standard A4.2.1 lett.b). Unlike for repatriation, no duty of substitution exists, and the flag State merely intervenes in order to guarantee the correct functioning of the employment relationship.
Before analysing the content of the amendment, a general observation can be made with respect to the rationale of the obligation to ensure the existence of a financial security. As already noted in relation to abandonment, the relationship between the shipowner and the seafarer is partially inspired by public interest, including national economic and security objectives, as well as the good government of the ship and of its crew. This explains why, in many legal orders, the maritime employment agreement has a ‘semi-public character’ and why the maritime administration often plays an active role in its stipulation.​[101]​ Notwithstanding this, the relationship between the shipowner and the seafarer remains, after all, a contractual one, whose violation is sanctioned through financial compensation.​[102]​ This idea therefore works as a blueprint for Regulation 4.2, which merely assigns the flag State the task of intervening in order to guarantee that the shipowner is able to compensate for the financial consequences of any breach of its duty to guarantee seafarers’ health and safety. The amendment was adopted to set out more precise requirements as regards the nature and functioning of this mechanism.

3.1 Compensation for Contractual Claims: Definition and Scope

The amendment adds new paragraphs (8 to 14) to Standard A4.2, as well as a new Standard A.4.2.2.
According to the new paragraph 8, national laws and regulations shall provide that the system of financial security mentioned by Standard A4.2.1 lett.b for contractual claims meets some ‘minimum requirements’. Standard A.4.2.2 States that, for the purposes of Standard A4.2.1.8, the term ‘contractual claim’ means any claim that relates to death or long-term disability of seafarers, due to an occupational injury, illness or hazard as set out in national law, the seafarer’s employment agreement or collective agreement.
Some Members stressed the fact that in some countries (e.g. Denmark) the concept of claim does not arise out of a contract but from national legislation implementing the requirement.​[103]​ Both the Secretariat and the seafarers’ representatives emphasized how, on the basis of the idea of ‘substantial equivalence’ that inspires the Convention,​[104]​ it was enough for a government to demonstrate  that it has a system in place capable of complying with the obligation to ensure the existence of a financial security system for seafarers.​[105]​ This flexibility is confirmed by Standard A.4.2.2.2, which states that financial security may be in the form of a social security scheme or insurance or fund, or other similar arrangements.
As regards the definition of ‘contractual claim’ provided by Standard A.4.2.2, a problem arose as to whether compensation would only apply to death or long-term disability or also to injury suffered by the seafarer. The uncertainty about this point is determined by the fact that, whereas Regulation 4.2.1 – the general rule – mandates the shipowner’s duty of support with respect to the financial consequences of sickness, injury or death, Standard A.4.2.1.1 lett.b (establishing the obligation of financial security upon which the amendment is based) mentions compensation in the event of the death or long-term disability of seafarers due​[106]​ to an occupational injury, illness or hazard.​[107]​ In the earliest stages of the drafting process, seafarers’ representatives supported the idea that seafarers should also have direct access to compensation for personal injuries,​[108]​ but this idea was eventually rejected both by shipowners and by the Government Group.​[109]​ The prevalence of this last position is clearly reflected in the text of Standard A.4.2.2.1, reinstating the formula used in Standard A.4.2.1.1 lett.b) and thus confirming that death or long-term disability deserve financial compensation, whereas there no intention exists to pay for the causes, that is, occupational injury, illness or hazard.​[110]​
The use of the terms ‘occupational injury’, ‘illness’ and ‘hazard’ was, in turn, a very delicate part of the definition of ‘contractual claim’. In earliest stages of discussion, the term ‘personal injury’, originally used by the IMO resolution,​[111]​ was rejected by shipowners, fearing that it would go beyond the text of the MLC.​[112]​ A further proposal sought to replace the term ‘illness’ with ‘sickness’ in order to guarantee recourse to financial security in case of short-term disability. However, this idea was not accepted because it might unduly expand the liability of shipowners.​[113]​ Other proposals concerned the addition of terms such as ‘valid’ or ‘appropriate’ to ‘contractual claim’ in order to ensure legitimization of the procedure,​[114]​ but the idea was opposed by several States and by seafarers’ representatives, according to whom it is implicit that contractual claims are appropriate.​[115]​
As noted in relation to Regulation 2.5, a preliminary problem when defining the obligation established by the amendments was the limitation of shipowners’ liability for injury or death caused by terrorism, force majeure, piracy or natural disasters. More precisely, the proposal, advanced by shipowners, to exclude these potential events from cases where liability arises, was rejected as being ‘unacceptable, by seafarers, who argued that the shipowner is liable for all such events.​[116]​ According to the Secretariat, Standard A4.2.2.1’s definition of contractual claim should provide an answer to this question, as this provision would imply that exclusion clauses would be permitted to the extent that they are compatible with Standard A.4.2.1 – to which the definition is tied – the seafarers’ employment agreement or the collective bargaining agreement.​[117]​ Even if, as has been noted, liability has to be distinguished from insurance,​[118]​, P&I clubs played a crucial role in the decision as to which risks were covered, as will be seen below.


3.2 The Content of the Obligation to Provide Financial Security for a Seafarer’s Death or Long-Term Disability

Paragraph 8 of the new Standard A.4.2.1 sets out in detail the ‘minimum requirements’ for the financial security. First of all, compensation has to be paid in full and without delay (lett.a). In the early stages of negotiations about the Standard, shipowners opposed the idea of full and prompt compensation, emphasized the importance of a correct assessment of the amount due, and suggested the possibility of ad hoc payments before a final assessment is made.​[119]​ This position was accepted in part, to the extent that interim payments are allowed where the long-term nature of the disability makes it difficult to assess the amount of compensation (lett.c).
The Standard next establishes that there should be no pressure on the seafarer to accept a payment less than the contractual amount (lett.b). Some representatives outlined the need to refine this provision to give an idea of what might constitute ‘pressure’,​[120]​ whereas the shipowners’ representatives expressed the opinion that there should also be an obligation not to bring undue pressure on the shipowner to compensate at a higher level than the contractual amount.​[121]​ Notwithstanding these views, the provision has not been refined in any way.
As in the case of seafarers’ abandonment, payment of compensation does not prejudice other available claims or rights, even if such payment may be offset by the shipowner against any damages resulting from other claims arising from the same incident (lett.d). It is to be noted, however, that whereas in the case of abandonment the possibility of excluding ‘dual recovery’ only refers to claims under the MLC, in this case no reference to the MLC is made, therefore giving to the provision a broader coverage.
Finally, the claim can be brought directly by the seafarer concerned, his next of kin, or a representative or designated beneficiary (lett.e).
The treatment of contractual claims is set out in further detail by Standard A4.2.2.3, which mandates effective arrangements to receive, deal with, and impartially settle claims under the terms of the Standard A.4.2.1.8 through expeditious and fair procedures. It is interesting to note that, in earlier drafts, this provision contained a reference to Standard A4.2.1 – establishing, in general terms, shipowners’ responsibility for health protection and medical care – and not to Standard A4.2.1 lett. b),​[122]​ and would have been a broad provision promoting the fair and rapid settlement of disputes about health protection and medical care.​[123]​ The adopted version reduces the scope of shipowners’ responsibilities by limiting its application to claims related to the financial security system.
Shipowners’ representatives have opposed the use of the term ‘impartial’ – referring to dispute settlement – in the definition of States’ obligations, not only because impartiality is already enshrined in the provisions of Standard A4.2.1, but also because the fulfilment of such a requirement was seen as an obligation of the flag State rather than of the shipowner.​[124]​ Seafarers’ representatives, on the other hand, emphasized the need for impartiality to be included in national legislation, as well as the fact that, as shipowners would deal with the claim, it was incumbent upon the flag State to establish the procedures it would follow.​[125]​

3.3 Certification of Financial Security and Notification Obligations

The new Standard contains a set of provisions relating to notification of financial security. First, it establishes that national laws and regulations shall ensure that seafarers receive prior notification if the financial security is to be cancelled or terminated (paragraph 9). Second, such notification must also be addressed to the competent authority of the flag State and it is specified that notification must come from the security provider (paragraph 10). Finally, the financial security shall not cease before the end of its period of validity unless the provider has given prior notification to the competent authority of the flag State (paragraph 12).
In an earlier version of the text, it was the duty of the financial security provider to notify seafarers; however, following a requests from the Shipowners’ Group – according to which it would have been too difficult for the provider to comply with this obligation – the provision was modified.​[126]​ It would be difficult for flag States to discharge this responsibility because, in particular, they do not directly regulate financial security providers,​[127]​ and also, unlike flag States that can be notified ex post,​[128]​ seafarers have to be informed prior to termination or cancellation.​[129]​ The duty to notify seafarers therefore falls upon shipowners, who remain liable in cases where the financial security is cancelled before the end of its validity period, which does not correspond to the five-year duration established for the DMLC.
According to some States, notification to the flag State of cancellation or termination of the security would imply the obligation for this latter to withdraw the related certificate.​[130]​ However, it has also been argued that this would place a heavy administrative burden on flag States, whose duty should instead be limited to having a monitoring system in place for notification activity.​[131]​ Flexibility for flag States’ duties is further justified by the fact that, in States where insurance is compulsory by virtue of a statutory system, cancellation or non-renewal of financial security is not legally possible.​[132]​
As regards certification, paragraph 13 establishes the obligation for flag States to carry on board a certificate or other documentary evidence issued by the financial security provider. The certificate must be posted in a conspicuous place where it is available to seafarers and Appendix A4-I defines its content. As already noted in relation to Regulation 2.5, Annex II of the DMLC was modified to include the certification of the existence of financial security. This certification was added to the documents that must be inspected by the flag State (Appendix A5.I) as well as by the port State (Annex A.5-III).
The amendment contains a model receipt and model release form, whereby the seafarer acknowledges receipt of a sum in satisfaction of the shipowner’s obligation and releases them from the related liability.

3.	Definition of Shipowners’ Liability: The Role of Protection & Indemnity Clubs

The MLC was amended in order to improve and strengthen seafarers’ rights in two situations – abandonment and death or long-term disability – the occurrence of which leads to shipowners’ liability, which, in turn, is frequently managed through the use of insurance. As has been observed, even though the MLC does not expressly require insurance – as the text simply speaks of a ‘financial security system’, leaving it to the Member States to decide the form, after consultation with shipowners’ and seafarers’ associations​[133]​ – insurance is a convenient way of fulfilling some of its requirements,​[134]​ and can be provided by fixed premium insurers and by P&I clubs.
This, first of all, confirms the general impression about the ‘private’ nature of the protection that is provided to seafarers: abandonment, death and disability are, in this context, seen as risks which, according to an insurance contract, will be indemnified to the assured by the underwriter, more than as events the occurrence of which should be prevented from a perspective of protection of human social rights.
P&I clubs are non-profit organizations with a mutual structure, and they cover their members (shipowners and charterers) against third party liabilities relating to the use and operation of ships.​[135]​ For a long time, P&I club representatives strongly opposed the idea of insuring, in particular, abandonment risk. This was due not only to the prevailing opinion of their members, but also to the fact that, having a mutual structure, they are not ‘naturally suited’ to providing protection against the financial default of their members, which is what usually happens in case of abandonment.​[136]​ In situations of financial hardship, members generally stop paying the ‘call’ (P&I premiums), so when abandonment occurs shipowners are no longer insured and other members are very unlikely to be willing to pay for the ex-member.​[137]​ It has also been observed that, if abandonment is considered as a breach of the contract of employment, it would not even fall under the cover of P&I clubs, because such a breach can be classed as a ‘credit default’ and P&I clubs are not financial security systems.
During the amendment negotiations, representatives of P&I clubs and shipowners emphasized how the absence of the common standard defences (war, terrorism, natural disasters) against the liability of financial security providers might create a strict liability regime that could undermine the normal operation of ships and which would not be covered under normal market conditions.​[138]​ Some representatives argued that limitation of liability was needed and referred to the IMO Athens Convention,​[139]​ the Protocol of which, adopted in 2002, introduces compulsory insurance to cover passengers on ships. In 2006, the IMO Legal Committee adopted the text of a reservation to the Protocol, where the Guidelines for implementation allow limitation of liability in respect of claims relating to war or terrorism.​[140]​
The above considerations particularly apply to piracy, recently removed from named perils by some insurers, and now covered only by purchasing a separate war risk policy and by paying an additional premium.​[141]​
A further issue is the so-called pay-to-be-rule, whereby a P&I club member has to discharge their liability to the third party before the club indemnifies them, which could be problematic in cases of shipowner insolvency.
Notwithstanding the fact that the text of the amendments remains silent on all the above aspects, since the beginning of discussions the attitude of P&I clubs showed to be a rather open one. As regards abandonment, the P&I representative in Tripartite Committee highlighted that, as of 2009, clubs agreed to cover repatriation costs following insolvency, and stated that ‘their reading’ of the proposed amendments suggested that insurers, whether P&I clubs or others, would have to provide financial assistance to repatriate seafarers, including those held captive by pirates.​[142]​
Moreover, P&I clubs confirmed the abolition, as of 2009, of the pay-to-be-paid rule for repatriation costs and for claims relating to death and long-term disability.​[143]​ According to Rule 1 of the 2013 Shipowners’ Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association Rules, ‘[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Rule 16 [payment first by the Member], where a Member has failed to discharge a legal liability to pay damages or compensation for personal injury, illness or death of a seafarer, the Association shall discharge or pay such claim on the Member’s behalf directly to such seafarer or dependant thereof.’ However, the provision is conditional and only applies where the seafarer or dependant ‘has no enforceable right of recovery against any other party and would otherwise be uncompensated’. During the Tripartite Committee discussions, the Government Group asked for clarification on this point and whether the Group of P&I Clubs could remove it upon the entry into force of the first amendment of the Convention.​[144]​





In the light of the issues considered above, it is possible to make some concluding remarks concerning the amendments to the Convention and their potential contribution to the protection of seafarers’ rights. If correctly implemented, the amendments will introduce effective tools capable of contributing to the enhancement of seafarers’ working conditions. On the other hand, obligations stemming from the Convention only bind States in the mutual relations, and therefore the effectiveness of the amendments depends on national implementation measures.
Further, as has been illustrated, States are not bound by any customary international law norms relating to the sectors covered by the amendments, apart from those concerning the treatment of aliens, whereas the effectiveness of applicable treaty-based obligations has so far proved to be limited.
By introducing abandonment as a case where repatriation is required, the amendments indirectly broaden the scope of cases where, according to Standard 2.5, States have to replace the shipowner if it does not comply with its duty to repatriate; however, the obligation only applies to the flag State, as the State from which the seafarer has to be repatriated and the State of which the seafarer is a national are only given the right to recover the costs from the flag State if they decide to undertake repatriation.
Because of these issues, an enhanced role for port States would have been recommendable, particularly for cases of abandonment. This option was reflected, for example, in the (unadopted) proposal, advanced in the Tripartite Committee, to add a new paragraph establishing the obligation, for the State in whose maritime jurisdiction a ship is located, to investigate potential abandonment.​[148]​ The same proposal suggested that notification of investigation should be provided by the same Member to the competent authority and to the financial security provider. Notwithstanding these suggestions, as well as other proposals contained in the IMO resolution on abandonment, no such obligation exists in the Convention and the role of port States is therefore limited to the control of the related certificates.
In addition to flag States and port States, the drafters of the MLC included a further category of States, that is those with labour-supplying responsibilities, to which the MLC assigns the duty to ensure the implementation of the requirements regarding the recruitment and placement of seafarers, as well as social security protection of seafarers that are its nationals, resident or otherwise domiciled in its territory.​[149]​ The rationale behind this new category is the awareness of the strong competition among countries, especially developing countries, to supply (often cheap) labour and the awareness of the need to regulate this process by imposing minimum standards of protection upon those States where recruitment takes place.
During discussions leading to the adoption of the amendments, the role of this additional category of States was questioned. In relation to abandonment, for example, the question was raised as to whether responsibility to ensure the existence of a financial security system could lie with the State where recruitment took place, as it was not the task of the flag State to establish such a system or even to oversee its effectiveness.​[150]​ Similarly, as regards compensation for death or long-term disability, a proposal was introduced that not only the flag State, but also the State with labour-supplying responsibilities be notified of the cancellation or termination of the financial security. The aim was to broaden the scope of States having the ability to provide assistance to seafarers.​[151]​
Looking at the text of the Convention, it is clear that, in both cases covered by the amendments, that is abandonment and death and personal injury, the State with labour-supply responsibilities has no duty concerning the financial security system. Once again, therefore, the flag State has the main burden of the obligations imposed, and the chance to strengthen the role of States where recruitment takes place has not been seized.
Nonetheless, there exist counterbalancing points in relation to the difficulties and limitations linked to the role of the State in the protection of seafarers’ rights. The first point stems from the Saiga (n.2) decision adopted by the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. As said above, in its ruling the Tribunal stated that, when a flag State decides to seek reparation for loss or damage caused to a ship, the nationalities of the members of the crew ‘are not relevant’.​[152]​ This view is confirmed by Article 18 of the ILC Draft Articles on diplomatic protection, which State that the right of the State of nationality of the members of the crew of a ship to exercise diplomatic protection is not affected by the right of the State of nationality of a ship to seek redress on behalf of such crew members, irrespective of their nationality, when they have been injured by an internationally wrongful act related to the vessel. Though stating how the aim of Article 18 is to recognize the right of both States to act on behalf of the members of the crew​[153]​ the text of the Commentaries focuses on the right of the flag State to do so, specifying how the provision finds support in arbitral and judicial decisions, including the Saiga ruling. On the basis of this latter ruling, ‘cogent policy reasons’ as well as ‘practical considerations’ are called into question; both are illustrated by recalling UNCLOS considerations regarding the multinational composition of a crew, therefore suggesting the relevance of the action that the flag State is expected to play with respect to the social rights of individuals who are not its nationals.​[154]​
The second point relates to death and long-term disability of seafarers and, in more general terms, to the obligations of States whose citizens suffer a significant injury. If, as has been observed, the only obligation imposed by the MLC on the flag State consists in guaranteeing that the shipowner provides financial compensation, then it is interesting to note how there appears to be, in international law, a tendency for a growing responsibility for States in cases where a national dies or suffers an injury. Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on jurisdictional immunities of States and their property denies State immunity from another State’s jurisdiction in proceedings that relate to pecuniary compensation for death or injury to the person, or damage to or loss of tangible property, caused by an act or omission which is alleged to be attributable to the State.​[155]​ Even though the problem is still seen as an issue of financial compensation, in both the Convention and the amendments to the MLC the clear intention is that the costs related to serious harm to an individual are not carried by the victim. This intention is reflected in Article 19 of the Draft Articles on diplomatic protection, which establishes that the State entitled to exercise diplomatic protection should give due consideration to the possibility of exercising it, especially when a ‘significant injury’ has occurred. According to the Commentaries, this provision can be explained on the basis of ‘growing support for the view that there is some obligation, however imperfect, on States … to protect their nationals abroad when they are subjected to significant human rights violations’.​[156]​
The assessment of the role played by the State would not be enough, however, to draw a complete picture relating to the effectiveness of the MLC and of its amendments. As an international human rights instrument, the Convention must also be analysed in the light of the role of the individual.
Some authors have emphasized the limited power of seafarers in the context of the MLC and observed how, unlike human rights instruments, the MLC does not grant seafarers inherent rights as individuals.​[157]​ Seafarers’ rights have to be implemented by States and, shipowners being the direct bearers of the obligations, States are not able to directly claim the rights against the State established by the MLC.​[158]​ If these rights are violated, compliance and enforcement mechanisms come into play, and involve the supervisory activities of the ILO, as well as countervailing activities by States.​[159]​ This is exactly what happens in the case of the obligation to provide a financial security, which is seen as a means of ensuring compliance with the obligations imposed upon shipowners by the Convention (i.e. repatriation and compensation for death and long-term disability); where States do not comply with their duties, seafarers have no venues for redress directly available to them.
Such a point of view must, however, be complemented by the view of those scholars underlining the relevance of private actors, which is what some authors have defined as a ‘privatized’ approach to achieving public interest objectives in maritime affairs.​[160]​ According to this point of view, the seafarer seen as an individual comes into play not only as the ‘object’ of State protection, but also as the ‘subject’ of the achievement of social rights. The amendments directly provide seafarers with an effective tool to enforce their rights under the Convention regardless of States’ action or inaction,​[161]​ which, in effect, is a type of ‘social clause’ in international trade relations.​[162]​
If, following these considerations, the relevance of the action of the individual is undeniable, it is equally true that, in the context of the MLC, the State basically intervenes in order to make sure that the obligations contained in what is essentially an employment relationship between the seafarer and their employer are complied with. As these obligations are of a financial nature, the duty of the State is to ensure a legislative framework that guarantees that shipowners face the costs stemming from abandonment, death and long-term disability. In turn, as abandonment, death and long-term disability are seen as risks – hence the role of P&I clubs – more than as a violation of workers’ rights, and the occurrence of these losses will be righted by financial compensation, prevention is one of the main objectives of the ILO and of its Members.
It is interesting to note how this approach was adopted, long before the introduction of the amendments to the MLC, in the European Union: in 2007, an analogous proposal was advanced to amend the Directive on the civil liability and financial guarantees of shipowners.​[163]​ The proposal makes explicit reference to the IMO resolution on abandonment, whereas no mention is made of the broader aim of protecting seafarers’ rights.​[164]​ However, even by reading the Communication from the Commission following the adoption of the MLC and encouraging ratification by EU Members,​[165]​ it is quite striking to note how, among the arguments supporting the adoption of the MLC, economic motivations seem to prevail over those linked to the protection of human and workers’ rights. In particular, the Communication emphasizes how the Convention should help to stabilize the maritime transport sector in the face of global competition and reduce the gap between European and third country operators and between different flags.​[166]​ The Commission also highlights the ‘constant pressure from the threat of relocation of recruitment of seafarers to the detriment of European jobs’, including in intra-Community transport, as well as the vast economic and legal differences affecting labour costs, including wages and social charges.​[167]​ Finally, the need to preserve the attractiveness of seafaring in front of an estimated shortage of 17,000 Community seafarers, as well as the potential harm for the maritime sector, including activities linked to PSC, are stressed.​[168]​
In the light of these elements, the idea can therefore be advanced that the reliance on financial compensation as a means to guarantee compliance with shipowners’ obligations could be at least partially due to the ‘competition concern’ felt not only by the EU, but also by all States that comply with their duties as flag States and which, for this reason, risk penalization in globalized shipping. If social rights are mainly seen through the lens of social dumping, it is reasonable for the State to act more as a watchdog of financial obligations more than in its role as a promoter and protector of international human rights.
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